Community-Centric Vanilla-Rollback Access, or: How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love My Computer

  • Mike Burmester
  • Breno de Medeiros
  • Alec Yasinsac
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4631)


We propose a new framework for authentication mechanisms that seek to interact with users in a friendlier way. Human or community-centric authentication supports vanilla access to users who fail an initial attempt to identify themselves. This limited access enables them to communicate with their peer community to achieve authentication. The actions of users with vanilla access can be rolled back in case they do not progress to full authentication status.

This mechanism is supported by a peer community trust infrastructure that exploits the effectiveness that humans have in understanding their communal roles in order to mitigate their lesser skill in remembering passwords or pins. The techniques involved essentially implement a human-centric key escrow and recovery mechanism.


Access Control Secret Sharing Secret Sharing Scheme Authentication Mechanism Access Control System 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mike Burmester
    • 1
  • Breno de Medeiros
    • 1
  • Alec Yasinsac
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306USA

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