Abstract
In this paper, we study competitive markets - a market is competitive if increasing the endowment of any one buyer does not increase the equilibrium utility of any other buyer. In the Fisher setting, competitive markets contain all markets with weak gross substitutability (WGS), a property which enable efficient algorithms for equilibrium computation. We show that every uniform utility allocation (UUA) market which is competitive, is a submodular utility allocation (SUA) market. Our result provides evidence for the existence of efficient algorithms for the class of competitive markets.
Work supported by NSF Grants 0311541, 0220343 and 0515186.
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Chakrabarty, D., Devanur, N. (2007). On Competitiveness in Uniform Utility Allocation Markets. In: Deng, X., Graham, F.C. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4858. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_41
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_41
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