Abstract
The choice of a bidding language is crucial in auction design in order to correctly capture bidder utilities. We propose a new bidding model for the Adwords auctions of search engine advertisement – decreasing valuation bids. This provides a richer language than the current model for advertisers to convey their preferences. Besides providing more expressivity, our bidding model has two additional advantages: It is an add-on to the standard model, and retains its simplicity of expression. Furthermore, it allows efficient algorithms – we show that the greedy (highest bid) algorithm retains its factor of 1/2 from the standard bidding model, and also provide an optimal allocation algorithm with a factor of 1-1/e (as is case in the standard bidding model).
We also show how these bidding languages achieve a good trade-off between expressivity and complexity – we demonstrate a slight generalization of these models for which the greedy allocation algorithm has an arbitrarily bad competitive ratio.
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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Goel, G., Mehta, A. (2007). Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids. In: Deng, X., Graham, F.C. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4858. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_35
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_35
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-77104-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-77105-0
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)