Abstract
It is well known that there is relationship between electromagnetic emanation and processing information in IT devices such as personal computers and smart cards. By analyzing such electromagnetic emanation, eavesdropper will be able to get some information, so it becomes a real threat of information security. In this paper, we show how to estimate amount of information that is leaked as electromagnetic emanation. We assume the area between the IT device and the receiver is a communication channel, and we define the amount of information leakage via electromagnetic emanations by its channel capacity. By some experimental results of Tempest, we show example estimations of amount of information leakage. Using the value of channel capacity, we can calculate the amount of information per pixel in the reconstructed image. And we evaluate the effectiveness of Tempest fonts generated by Gaussian method and its threshold of security.
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Tanaka, H. (2007). Information Leakage Via Electromagnetic Emanations and Evaluation of Tempest Countermeasures. In: McDaniel, P., Gupta, S.K. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4812. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77086-2_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77086-2_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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