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Improved Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on Reduced-Round DES

  • Orr Dunkelman
  • Gautham Sekar
  • Bart Preneel
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4859)

Abstract

The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a 64-bit block cipher. Despite its short key size of 56 bits, DES continues to be used to protect financial transactions valued at billions of Euros. In this paper, we investigate the strength of DES against attacks that use a limited number of plaintexts and ciphertexts. By mounting meet-in-the-middle attacks on reduced-round DES, we find that up to 6-round DES is susceptible to this kind of attacks. The results of this paper lead to a better understanding on the way DES can be used.

Keywords

Time Complexity Block Cipher Alternative Description Data Encryption Standard Linear Cryptanalysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Orr Dunkelman
    • 1
  • Gautham Sekar
    • 1
  • Bart Preneel
    • 1
  1. 1.Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Department of Electrical Engineering ESAT/SCD-COSIC, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001 Leuven-HeverleeBelgium

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