Risk Balance in Exchange Protocols

  • Mohammad Torabi Dashti
  • Yanjing Wang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4846)


We study the behaviour of rational agents in exchange protocols which rely on trustees. We allow malicious parties to compromise the trustee by paying a cost and, thereby, present a game analysis that advocates exchange protocols which induce balanced risks on the participants. We also present a risk-balanced protocol for fair confidential secret comparison.


Nash Equilibrium Hash Function Exchange Protocol Fair Exchange Game Analysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mohammad Torabi Dashti
    • 1
  • Yanjing Wang
    • 1
  1. 1.CWI, Amsterdam 

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