Abstract
Implementing global passive adversary attacks on currently deployed low latency anonymous networks is not feasible. This paper describes the implementation of a large scale, discrete event based simulation of Tor, using the SSFNet simulator. Several global passive adversary attacks are implemented on a simulated Tor network comprised of approximately 6000 nodes. The attacks prove to be highly accurate (80 percent stream correlation rate) for low traffic conditions but significantly less effective on denser, multiplexed links (18 percent success rate).
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O’Gorman, G., Blott, S. (2007). Large Scale Simulation of Tor:. In: Cervesato, I. (eds) Advances in Computer Science – ASIAN 2007. Computer and Network Security. ASIAN 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4846. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_5
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