One-Time Receiver Address in IPv6 for Protecting Unlinkability

  • Atsushi Sakurai
  • Takashi Minohara
  • Ryota Sato
  • Keisuke Mizutani
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4846)


Privacy is one of the most desirable properties in modern communication systems like the Internet. There are many techniques proposed to protect message contents, but it is difficult to protect message addresses because they should be clear to message router. In this paper we propose a mechanism of one-time receiver address in IPv6 for providing unlinkability against eavesdroppers. In our system, a pair of sender and receiver independently generate an identical sequence of addresses by using a secret key exchanged in advance. The sender changes the destination address every time when it initiates a transaction, and only the corresponding receiver can follow the change of the address. We have implemented the proposed mechanism on Linux systems. The prototype system hides relation between transactions with small overhead.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Goldberg, I.: Privacy-enhancing technologies for the internet, II, five years later. In: Federrath, H. (ed.) Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies. LNCS, vol. 2009, pp. 1–12. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Kent, S., Seo, K.: Security architecture for the internet protocol. RFC 4301 (December 2005)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Dierks, T., Rescorla, E.: The transport layer security (TLS) protocol. RFC 4346 (April 2006)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Atkins, D., Stallings, W., Zimmermann, P.: PGP message exchange formats. RFC 1991 (August 1996)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Pfitzmann, A., Hansen, M.: Anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability, pseudonymity, and identity management – a consolidated proposal for terminology (July 2007),
  6. 6.
    Droms, R.: Dynamic host configuration protocol. RFC 2131 (March 1997)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Narten, T., Draves, R.: Privacy extensions for stateless address autoconfiguration in IPv6. RFC 3041 (January 2001)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Thomson, S., Narten, T.: Ipv6 stateless address autoconfiguration. RFC 2462 (December 1998)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Goldschlag, D., Reed, M., Syverson, P.: Onion routing. Communications of The ACM 42(2), 31–41 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Waters, B.R., Felten, E.W., Sahai, A.: Receiver anonymity via incomparable public keys. In: CCS 2003. Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security, Washington D.C., USA, pp. 112–121 (2003)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Bricklin, D.: Friend-to-friend networks (August 2000),
  12. 12.
    Chothia, T., Chatzikokolakis, K.: A survey of anonymous peer-to-peer file-sharing. In: Enokido, T., Yan, L., Xiao, B., Kim, D., Dai, Y., Yang, L.T. (eds.) Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing – EUC 2005 Workshops. LNCS, vol. 3823, pp. 744–755. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Diffie, W., Hellman, M.E.: New directions in cryptography. IEEE Trans. of Information Theory 22(6), 644–654 (1976)zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    WIDE Project: USAGI project – linux IPv6 development project,

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Atsushi Sakurai
    • 1
  • Takashi Minohara
    • 1
  • Ryota Sato
    • 1
  • Keisuke Mizutani
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science, Takushoku University, 815-1 Tatemachi, Hachioji, Tokyo 193-0985Japan

Personalised recommendations