Abstract
The theory on the evolution of preferences deals with the endogenous formation of preference relations in strategic situations. It is related to the field of evolutionary game theory. Models are based on the ‘indirect evolutionary approach’ according to which preferences determine choice behavior which in turn determines evolutionary success. The latter eventually governs the evolution of preferences. Literature usually considers a class of preferences which admit an expected utility representation. In this doctoral monograph we analyze the role and the influence of general, possibly non-expected utility preferences in such an evolutionary setup. In particular, we investigate whether preferences which diverge from von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility may potentially prove to be successful under evolutionary pressures. Furthermore, we contribute to the research into existence issues for so-called stable populations.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2008). Introduction. In: Evolution of Non-Expected Utility Preferences. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 606. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76845-6_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76845-6_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-76841-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-76845-6
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)