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Asynchronous Pseudo Physical Memory Snapshot and Forensics on Paravirtualized VMM Using Split Kernel Module

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Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2007 (ICISC 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4817))

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Abstract

VMM (virtual machine monitor) provides the useful inspection and interposition of the guest OS. With proper modification of the guest OS and VMM, we can obtain incident-driven memory snapshot for malicious code forensics. In this paper we propose an asynchronous memory snapshot and forensics using split kernel module. Our split kernel module works for the virtualized interruption handling, which notifies the security incident on the guest OS. On frontend, we insert virtualized interruption into source code of MAC (mandatory access control) module and other security modules. Then, backend kernel module receives interruption as the asynchronous incident notification. In experiment, we take RAM snapshot of LKM-rootkit installation using system call extension. Frequently appeared strings are extracted in order to find the evidence memory blocks which was assigned for LKM-rootkit. Also, it is showed that asynchronous snapshot enables us to find the evidence of malicious software in memory snapshot by simple string analysis in linear time.

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Kil-Hyun Nam Gwangsoo Rhee

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Ando, R., Kadobayashi, Y., Shinoda, Y. (2007). Asynchronous Pseudo Physical Memory Snapshot and Forensics on Paravirtualized VMM Using Split Kernel Module. In: Nam, KH., Rhee, G. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2007. ICISC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4817. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76788-6_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76788-6_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-76787-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-76788-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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