Auszug
Wähler und Politiker sind Menschen mit eigenen Interessen. Ihr Verhalten in der politischen Sphäre mag von Überzeugungen mitgeprägt sein. Jedoch gibt es wenig Grund zu der Annahme, dass die politischen Handlungen aller am politischen Prozess Beteiligten nicht auch wirtschaftlichen Interessen folgen würden. Im Übrigen orientieren sich Überzeugungen gelegentlich am eigenen Interessen. Modelle der politischen Ökonomie machen die extreme Annahme, dass ausschliesslich wirtschaftliche Interessen politisches Verhalten diktieren. Die politisch ökonomische Analyse erklärt wirtschaftspolitische Ergebnisse auf Basis dieser Annahme. Modellexogen sind in solch einer Untersuchung nur die Regeln des politischen Spiels.
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(2008). Grundmodelle der direkten und der indirekten Demokratie. In: Wirtschaftspolitik. Springer-Lehrbuch. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75800-6_4
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