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Hiding Information in Multi Level Security Systems

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Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST 2006)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 4691))

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze the possibility for malicious agents to transmit an information possibly hidden in a Multi Level Security System via a covert channel. We give a framework for which we get two decidability results. Firstly, given a code and a system one can decide whether the system allows a covert channel for this code. Secondly, one can decide whether there exists a code to transmit one bit of information, the code is computable as well as the strategies of the two partners.

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Theo Dimitrakos Fabio Martinelli Peter Y. A. Ryan Steve Schneider

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Beauquier, D., Lanotte, R. (2007). Hiding Information in Multi Level Security Systems. In: Dimitrakos, T., Martinelli, F., Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S. (eds) Formal Aspects in Security and Trust. FAST 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4691. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75227-1_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75227-1_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-75226-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-75227-1

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