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On the Power of Impersonation Attacks

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Distributed Computing (DISC 2007)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 4731))

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Abstract

In the standard message passing models it is assumed that the identity of a sender is known to the receiver. In practice, this often is not the case, due to impersonation attacks by malicious adversaries. Various impersonation attack schemes have been extensively investigated in the context of network security or cryptography, in particular for peep-to-peer and sensor networks [4,5]. Here, we study this problem in the context of distributed computing theory.

This research was partially supported by Sir Charles Clore fellowship and the Ministry of Defence.

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Andrzej Pelc

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Okun, M. (2007). On the Power of Impersonation Attacks. In: Pelc, A. (eds) Distributed Computing. DISC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4731. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75142-7_42

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75142-7_42

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-75141-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-75142-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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