Abstract
Recently, we challenged the belief that randomized Byzantine agreement protocols are inefficient, by designing, implementing and assessing the performance of a stack of protocols of that type [3]. That assessment lead us to a set of properties desirable for Byzantine asynchronous binary consensus protocols: (1) Strong validity . if all correct processes propose the same value v, the decision is v (values proposed by Byzantine processes are often useless); (2) Asynchrony . no time assumptions are made (systems are often prone to arbitrary delays); (3) Decentralization . there is no leader (leader elections have a great impact on performance); (4) Optimal resilience - n ≥ 3f +1 processes to tolerate f Byzantine (extra processes are costly); (5) Optimal message complexity . O(n2) (high impact on throughput); (6) Signature freedom (high impact of signatures based on public-key cryptography on the performance); (7) Early decision . in “nice” runs the protocol should decide in a few communication steps (good latency in the “normal” case).
Work supported by project IST-4-027513-STP (CRUTIAL) and LaSIGE.
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Bessani, A.N., Correia, M., Moniz, H., Neves, N.F., Verissimo, P. (2007). When 3f + 1 Is Not Enough: Tradeoffs for Decentralized Asynchronous Byzantine Consensus. In: Pelc, A. (eds) Distributed Computing. DISC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4731. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75142-7_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75142-7_36
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