A New Forgery Scenario Based on Regaining Dynamics of Signature

  • Jean Hennebert
  • Renato Loeffel
  • Andreas Humm
  • Rolf Ingold
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4642)


We present in this paper a new forgery scenario for dynamic signature verification systems. In this scenario, we assume that the forger has got access to a static version of the genuine signature, is using a dedicated software to automatically recover dynamics of the signature and is using these regained signatures to break the verification system. We also show that automated procedures can be built to regain signature dynamics, making some simple assumptions on how signatures are performed. We finally report on the evaluation of these procedures on the MCYT-100 signature database on which regained versions of the signatures are generated. This set of regained signatures is used to evaluate the rejection performance of a baseline dynamic signature verification system. Results show that the regained forgeries generate much more false acceptation in comparison to the random and low-force forgeries available in the MCYT-100 database. These results clearly show that such kind of forgery attacks can potentially represent a critical security breach for signature verification systems.


Dynamic Signature Forgery Attack Instantaneous Speed Segment Detection Genuine Signature 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean Hennebert
    • 1
  • Renato Loeffel
    • 1
  • Andreas Humm
    • 1
  • Rolf Ingold
    • 1
  1. 1.Université de Fribourg, Boulevard de Pérolles 90, 1700 FribourgSwitzerland

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