Abstract
“Who taught you game theory?” was a question Hugo’s students from the early 1980s were often asked. Even though Princeton was the birthplace of game theory, it was a legitimate question. Of the giants of the 1950s, only Harold Kuhn remained, and his research interests had drifted away from game theory to computation. I, for one, had never taken a course in game theory while at Princeton and at first found myself fumbling for an answer. When I arrived there in 1978, Hugo was, of course, renowned for his work in many areas — general equilibrium, social choice, demand theory — but game theory was not one of these. Yet almost all of his students from this time wrote dissertations on various game theoretic topics and went on to specialize in this area.
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Benoit, JP., Krishna, V. (2008). Vijay Krishna on Hugo F. Sonnenschein. In: Jackson, M.O., McLennan, A. (eds) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74057-5_12
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