Abstract
I came to Princeton in Fall 1980 to begin, as it turned out, three of the most important years of my life. I am, professionally, what was coaxed into shape there. Hugo was a central element of this defining experience.
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Abreu, D., Matsushima, H. (2008). Dilip Abreu on Hugo F. Sonnenschein. In: Jackson, M.O., McLennan, A. (eds) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74057-5_11
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