Abstract
What a wonderful occasion it is to be celebrating 65 years of Hugo Sonnenschein! Given his many contributions to economic research and academia more broadly, there is much to celebrate. This volume, presented to Hugo at a conference in his honor at the University of Chicago in October 2005, highlights one of his deepest contributions. It is perhaps the hardest to detect from reading his bios and vita; but something that he is famous for among economists in general and economic theorists in particular. It is his incredible record as a mentor and advisor of students.
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(2008). Introduction. In: Jackson, M.O., McLennan, A. (eds) Foundations in Microeconomic Theory. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74057-5_1
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