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Abstract

In this paper we examine the security issues in functionality extension mechanisms supported by web browsers. Extensions (or “plug-ins”) in modern web browsers enjoy unlimited power without restraint and thus are attractive vectors for malware. To solidify the claim, we take on the role of malware writers looking to assume control of a user’s browser space. We have taken advantage of the lack of security mechanisms for browser extensions and have implemented a piece of malware for the popular Firefox web browser, which we call browserSpy, that requires no special privileges to be installed. Once installed, browserSpy takes complete control of a user’s browser space and can observe all the activity performed through the browser while being undetectable. We then adopt the role of defenders to discuss defense strategies against such malware. Our primary contribution is a mechanism that uses code integrity checking techniques to control the extension installation and loading process. We also discuss techniques for runtime monitoring of extension behavior that provide a foundation for defending threats due to installed extensions.

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Bernhard M. Hämmerli Robin Sommer

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Ter Louw, M., Lim, J.S., Venkatakrishnan, V.N. (2007). Extensible Web Browser Security. In: M. Hämmerli, B., Sommer, R. (eds) Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4579. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73614-1_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73614-1_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-73613-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-73614-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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