Abstract
This paper attempts to comprehensively characterize economic-based incentive compatible routing and forwarding mechanisms in ad hoc network, including hidden information in routing phase, and hidden action in forwarding phase. By incentive compatibility it means that system designer should respect rationality of nodes, and design proper incentive mechanisms to encourage nodes to conduct something beneficial to the whole system, while nodes pursued their own utility. Firstly, based on analysis of extensive game form, we argue that, for each participant, truth-telling is the expected dominant strategy equilibrium in VCG-like routing mechanism, even under the situation of mutually dependent link cost. Then, Individual rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints are formally offered, which should be satisfied by any game theoretical routing and forwarding scheme. And different solution concepts are investigated to characterize the economic meanings of two kind forwarding approaches, that is, Nash equilibrium with no per-hop monitoring and dominant strategy equilibrium with per-hop monitoring. Finally, we discuss frugality problem in VCG-like mechanism.
Research supported by the NSFC Grants 60472067, JiangSu education bureau (5KJB510091) and State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT).
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Michiardi, P., Molva, R.: Core: a COllaborative REputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile Ad Hoc networks. In: Proc. of IFIP Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security (2002)
Buchegger, S., Boudec, J.Y.L.: Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol: cooperation of nodes-fairness in distributed Ad-hoc networks. In: Proc. of IEEE/ACM Workshop on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, 2002, ACM Press, New York (2002)
Yu, W., Liu, K.J.R.: Attack-resistant cooperation stimulation in autonomous Ad Hoc networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications: Autonomic Communication Systems (2005)
Feldman, M., Chuang, J., Stoica, I., Shenker, S.: Hidden-action in multi-hop routing. In: Proc. of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (2005)
Buttyan, L., Hubaux, J.: Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad hoc network. ACM/Kluwer Mobile Networks and Applications 8 (2003)
Zhong, S., Chen, J., Yang, Y.R.: Sprite: A simple, cheat-proof, credit-based system for mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. In: Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos (2003)
Anderegg, L., Eidenbenz, S.: Ad hoc-VCG: a truthful and cost-efficient routing protocol for mobile Ad hoc networks with selfish agents. In: Proc. of ACM Mobi. Com., ACM Press, New York (2003)
Zhong, S., Li, L.E., Liu, Y.G., Yang, R.Y.: On designing incentive-compatible routing and forwarding protocols in wireless Ad-Hoc networks-an integrated approach using game theoretical and cryptographic techniques. In: Proc. of ACM MobiCom, ACM Press, New York (2005)
Eidenbenz, S., Resta, G., Santi, P.: COMMIT: A sender-centric truthful and energy-efficient routing protocol for Ad Hoc networks with selfish nodes. In: Proc. IEEE Workshop on Algorithms for Wireless, Mobile, Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks (2005)
Nisan, N., Ronen, A.: Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior 11 (2001)
Wang, Y.F., Hori, Y., Sakurai, K.: On studying incentive-compatible mechanism in open networks. Technical Report, Kyushu University (2006)
Archer, A.F.: Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents, available online: http://www.research.att.com/~aarcher/Research/thesis-final.ps
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Wang, Y., Hori, Y., Sakurai, K. (2007). On Characterizing Economic-Based Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms to Solving Hidden Information and Hidden Action in Ad Hoc Network . In: Indulska, J., Ma, J., Yang, L.T., Ungerer, T., Cao, J. (eds) Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing. UIC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4611. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73549-6_38
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73549-6_38
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-73548-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-73549-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)