Abstract
We formalize the definition of symmetric auctions to study fundamental properties of incentive compatible auction protocols. We characterize such auction protocols for those with a fixed number of items to sell and study some important properties of those with an indefinite number of sales.
This research is supported by SRG grant (7001989) of City University of Hong Kong.
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Deng, X., Iwama, K., Qi, Q., Sun, A.W., Tasaka, T. (2007). Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions. In: Lin, G. (eds) Computing and Combinatorics. COCOON 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4598. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73545-8_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73545-8_27
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-73544-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-73545-8
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