Abstract
Theories of lobbying differ considerably about which legislators are most likely to be lobbied by which types of interest groups. In particular, there is not agreement as to whether lobbyists will focus on those likely to be sympathetic to the interest group (their friends), or those likely to be unsympathetic to the interest group (their enemies).1 Plausible arguments can be made in each direction. One lobbies one’s friends to offer information that will help them draft legislation and fend off criticism, and to remind them of past obligations and future payoffs (carrots); one lobbies one’s enemies because they need to be exposed to arguments and facts countervailing their most likely position, and to alert them that this is an important vote that will be remembered and might cost them the opposition of an interest group in future re-election efforts (sticks).
See Austen-Smith and Wright (1994, 1996), Baumgartner and Leech(1996a, 1996b).
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Godfrey, J., Grofman, B. (2008). Pivotal Voting Theory: The 1993 Clinton Health Care Reform Proposal in the U.S. Congress. In: Braham, M., Steffen, F. (eds) Power, Freedom, and Voting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_8
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