Abstract
The study of the formation and dissolution of alliances of voters aiming to increase their voting power is relatively new. The present note is a sequel to our earlier paper on this subject (see Felsenthal and Machover 2002). Since the latter’s publication, we have obtained some new results which can be viewed also as a complement to some of the results obtained by Gelman (2003).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Andjiga, N.G., Badirou, D. and Mbih, B. (2006) On the Evaluation of Power in Parliaments and Government Formation, mimeo. http://crem.univ.rennes1.fr/site_francais/doctravail/2006/ie-200618.pdf
Chua, V.C.H. and Felsenthal, D.S. (2008) Coalition Formation Theories Revisited: An empirical investigation of Aumann’s Hypothesis, in M. Braham and F. Steffen (eds) Power, Freedom, and Voting, Springer, 159–183.
van Damme, E. (Interviewer) (1997) On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann, in W. Albers et al. (eds) Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer. Reprinted in Games and Economic Behavior 24 (1998): 181–210.
Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1998) The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes, Edward Elgar.
Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2000) Voting Power and Parliamentary Defections: the 1953–54 French National Assembly Revisited, mimeo. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000594.
Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (2002) Annexations and Alliances: When are Blocs Advantageous A Priori? Social Choice and Welfare 19: 295–312.
Gelman, A. (2003) Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability, Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 2, Article 13, 1–14. http://bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol2/iss1/art13
Owen, G. (1982) Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index for Games with A Priori Unions, in M.J. Holler (ed.) Power, Voting, and Voting Power, Physica Verlag.
Riker, W.H. (1959) A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index, Behavioral Science 4: 120–131.
Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954) A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 48: 787–792.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Felsenthal, D.S., Machover, M. (2008). Further Reflections on the Expediency and Stability of Alliances. In: Braham, M., Steffen, F. (eds) Power, Freedom, and Voting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-73381-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-73382-9
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)