Abstract
When two factions clash within a committee, a company, or a country, a natural question to ask is: Why don’t they share power or responsibilities and try to reach a compromise that, while leaving neither faction in control, at least leaves neither too aggrieved.
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Brams, S.J., Kilgour, D.M. (2008). The Instability of Power Sharing. In: Braham, M., Steffen, F. (eds) Power, Freedom, and Voting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_12
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