Abstract
In a wide range of political systems, decision making requires the support of a majority. When majorities are backed by coalitions, then they are organized either for a given period of time or on a case by case basis (i.e. for single proposals). In Germany, for instance, minority governments are rare and the first case prevails. In any case, there may be a unique party that is entitled to form a coalition (called formateur), or any party may be entitled to do so. We are interested in the non-cooperative treatment of a formateur model, and based on this, we want to discuss bargaining power.
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Bolle, F., Breitmoser, Y. (2008). Coalition Formation, Agenda Selection, and Power. In: Braham, M., Steffen, F. (eds) Power, Freedom, and Voting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_10
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