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Private Handshakes

  • Jaap-Henk Hoepman
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4572)

Abstract

Private handshaking allows pairs of users to determine which (secret) groups they are both a member of. Group membership is kept secret to everybody else. Private handshaking is a more private form of secret handshaking [BRS+03], because it does not allow the group administrator to trace users. We extend the original definition of a handshaking protocol to allow and test for membership of multiple groups simultaneously. We present simple and efficient protocols for both the single group and multiple group membership case.

Private handshaking is a useful tool for mutual authentication, demanded by many pervasive applications (including RFID) for privacy. Our implementations are efficient enough to support such usually resource constrained scenarios.

Keywords

secret handshakes group membership authentication pervasive security 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jaap-Henk Hoepman
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.TNO Information and Communication Technology, P.O. Box 1416, 9701 BK GroningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Institute for Computing and Information Sciences, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9010, 6500 GL NijmegenThe Netherlands

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