Abstract
Modeling an interactive situation as a non-cooperative game is perhaps the most common approach in game theory. The standard assumption is that players are rational and have a perfect foresight. If they are not perfectly informed about the situation or about the past behavior of other players they still know all the relevant chances. In addition, preferences and information of each player are common knowledge to all of them. These assumptions facilitate a relatively straightforward analysis that often provides simple and exact results. The conventional task is to find the equilibria of the game. An equilibrium is any collection of actions, one for each player, such that it is in each player’s self interest to play her action if all other players play theirs.
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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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(2008). Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Network Dilemma Games. In: Partner Choice and Cooperation in Networks. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 598. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73016-3_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73016-3_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-73015-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-73016-3
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