Abstract
This chapter contains some basic results on the core of coalitional TU games. First the Bondareva-Shapley theorem which gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the nonemptiness of the core is proved. As an application of the foregoing theorem, we show that the core of a market game is nonempty. If the core of a game is nonempty, then the game is called balanced. A game is totally balanced if all of its subgames are balanced. The player set and the coalition function of a subgame are a subcoalition and the corresponding restriction of the coalition function of the game. In Section 3.3 we show that a coalitional game is a market game if and only if it is totally balanced. We prove in Section 3.4 that minimum cost spanning tree games and permutation games are totally balanced.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2007). The Core. In: Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 34. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-72944-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-72945-7
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)