Abstract
In this chapter the classical bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set, which have been discussed in Chapter 4, are generalized to NTU games. Simple majority voting games are used to investigate some of the properties and to compare these solution concepts.
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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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(2007). On the Classical Bargaining Set and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set for NTU Games. In: Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 34. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72945-7_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-72944-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-72945-7
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