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Debt resolution processes for sovereign debt – current policy issues

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Abstract

Over the last few years, sovereign debt restructurings have often been difficult and somewhat disorderly. Agreement on how to best undertake such restructuring and involve the private sector in the process has also been elusive. However, support for a market-oriented contractual approach to debt restructuring has recently gathered considerable momentum while the statutory approach to sovereign debt resolution continues to be challenged by the private sector.

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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(2007). Debt resolution processes for sovereign debt – current policy issues. In: Challenges at the Bank for International Settlements. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72790-3_6

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