Abstract
Among the many interests of Beat Blankart is Constitutional Political Economy. A few years ago we published an article setting out possible constitutional reforms that would improve the workings of the democratic process in Germany and perhaps other countries (Blankart and Mueller, 2002). This was followed up by a conference on the draft constitution for the European Union (Blankart and Mueller, 2004). My contribution to the conference was an essay critiquing the list of rights included in the draft constitution. My contribution to this Festschrift honoring Beat returns to the theme of constitutional rights. After first sketching the logic underlying the justification for delineating rights in a constitution, I illustrate some of their properties by discussing recent examples of the use and misuse of the rights concept.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bilefsky D (2007) Berlin Seeks to Bar Holocaust Denial in EU. International Herald Tribune, p 3
Blankart CB, Mueller DC (2002) Alternativen der parlamentarischen Demokratie. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 3(1), pp 1–21
Blankart CB, Mueller DC (2004) (eds) A Constitution for the European Union. The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, (CESifo Seminar Series)
Buchanan JM (1975) The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Buchanan JM, Tullock G (1962) The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press
Kavka GS (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.
Mill JS (1962) Utilitarianism. In: Mary Warnock (ed) Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on Bentham. Meridian Books, Cleveland (first published in London, 1863)
Rae DW (1969) Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice. American Political Science Review 63, pp 40–56
Rawls JA (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press
Reimer M (1951) The Case for Bare Majority Rule. Ethics 62, pp 16–32
Rutland RA (1985) How the Constitution Protects Rights: A Look at the Seminal Years. In: Goldwin RA, Schambra WA (eds) How does the Constitution Secure Rights? American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., pp 1–14
Sen AK (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Holden-Day, San Francisco
Sen AK (1970) The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. Journal of Political Economy 78, pp 152–7
Steiner H (1994) An Essay on Rights. Blackwell, Oxford
Storing HJ (1985) The Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In: Goldwin RA, Schambra WA (eds) How does the Constitution Secure Rights? American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., pp 15–35
Sunstein CR (1996) Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford University Press, New York
Waldron J (1988) The Right to Property. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mueller, D.C. (2007). Rights and Wrongs. In: Baake, P., Borck, R. (eds) Public Economics and Public Choice. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72782-8_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72782-8_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-72781-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-72782-8
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)