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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 595))

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Abstract

Negotiations are complex, ill-structured, and uncertainty-prone processes subject to half-truths, tricks, and other means of psychological warfare (Ströbel, 2003, Ch. 2). In other words, negotiating is a demanding task with plenty of potential for making mistakes. As Bazerman (2006) points out, identifying and understanding systematic mistakes may lead to improved negotiation processes as well as facilitate the engineering of negotiation support systems. One possible systematic bias in negotiations regards attachment and the endogeneity of reference points and preferences. The following historical example illustrates the importance of endogenous reference points in negotiations, i.e. reference points that emerge in a negotiation as a results of the negotiation itself.

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© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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(2007). Introduction. In: Preferences in Negotiations. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 595. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72338-7_1

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