Summary. Direct reference theorists and Fregeans have different opinions on how to explain belief reports of sentences containing proper names. In this paper I suggest an alternative way to understand how successful de re communication is possible, based on which I give an explanation of belief ascription that seems to avoid the shortcomings of both camps.
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Ren, Y. (2007). Belief Ascription and De Re Communication. In: Magnani, L., Li, P. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science, Technology, and Medicine. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 64. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71986-1_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71986-1_9
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