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Protection Against Unfair Competition at the International Level — The Paris Convention, the 1996 Model Provisions and the Current Work of the World Intellectual Property Organisation

  • Chapter
Law Against Unfair Competition

Part of the book series: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law ((MSIP,volume 1))

Abstract

One of the main characteristics of a market economy is the presence of competition between various actors in the market.1 The question where the line should be drawn between fair competition and unacceptable competitive behaviour has created abundant debate and literature. In the 90s, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) undertook a number of activities dealing with the topic of protection against unfair competition. A study on protection against unfair competition reflecting the world situation at that time was presented in 1994.2 WIPO Model Provisions on Protection Against Unfair Competition were published in 1996.3 In section 2. which follows, Art. 10bis of the Paris Convention which anchors the protection against unfair competition in the international legal framework of industrial property rights, will be discussed. An analysis of the 1996 Model Provisions will be conducted in section 3. Section 4., the final section, contains concluding remarks and an outlook.

Revised and expanded version of a presentation made at the Conference on Unfair Competition Law organised by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Budapest, June 16 to 18, 2005. The views expressed in the present article are those of the authors. They do not constitute an official position of the World Intellectual Property Organisation or of any of its Member States.

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References

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  75. A closer analysis of the influence of constitutional guarantees is not unlikely to trigger a much broader discussion going beyond the context of comparative advertising. Cf. Timbers & Huston, “The “Artistic Relevance Test” Just Became Relevant: the Increasing Strength of the First Amendment as a Defense to Trademark Infringement and Dilution,” 93 Trademark Reporter 1278–1301 (2004); Cantwell, “Confusion, Dilution and Speech: First Amendment Limitations on the Trademark Estate: An Update,” 94 Trademark Reporter 547–584 (2004). In respect of the general tendency to have recourse to constitutional guarantees in order to achieve balanced results in intellectual property law, see Geiger, “Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual Property Law?,” 35 IIC 268–280 (2004).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Law and International Classifications Division, Sector of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, WIPO, Geneva

    Marcus Höpperger (Acting Director)

  2. Law Section, Sector of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, WIPO, Geneva

    Martin Senftleben (Dr. iur., Associate Officer)

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    Reto M. Hilty  & Frauke Henning-Bodewig  & 

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Höpperger, M., Senftleben, M. (2007). Protection Against Unfair Competition at the International Level — The Paris Convention, the 1996 Model Provisions and the Current Work of the World Intellectual Property Organisation. In: Hilty, R.M., Henning-Bodewig, F. (eds) Law Against Unfair Competition. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71882-6_3

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