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Random Visitor: A Defense Against Identity Attacks in P2P Overlay Networks

  • Jabeom Gu
  • Jaehoon Nah
  • Cheoljoo Chae
  • Jaekwang Lee
  • Jongsoo Jang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4298)

Abstract

The characteristics of cooperative and trustworthy interaction in peer-to-peer overlay network are seriously challenged by the open nature of the network. The impact is particularly large when the identifiers of resource and peer are not verified because the whole network can be compromised by such attacks as sybil or eclipse. In this paper, we present an identifier authentication mechanism called random visitor, which is a third party who is serving as a delegate of an identity proof. Design rationale and framework details are presented. Discussion about the strength and cost of the proposed scheme is also presented.

Keywords

Overlay Network Distribute Hash Table Trusted Third Party Sybil Attack Proof Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jabeom Gu
    • 1
  • Jaehoon Nah
    • 1
  • Cheoljoo Chae
    • 2
  • Jaekwang Lee
    • 2
  • Jongsoo Jang
    • 1
  1. 1.Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, Daejeon 305-350Korea
  2. 2.Hannam University, Daejeon 306-791Korea

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