Abstract
In this paper we consider the problem of finding the solution of a differential game in relation with choosing an optimal tax policy rule. The paper extends the existing literature in two directions. First, instead of treating the tax base as given, in our formulation it is a control variable for the government. Secondly, we impose a phase constraint of mixed type for the considered problem of taxation. We present new conditions under which the solution of the differential game is found explicitly. The obtained optimal tax policy is time-consistent.
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Rozenov, R., Krastanov, M.I. (2007). Differential Games and Optimal Tax Policy. In: Boyanov, T., Dimova, S., Georgiev, K., Nikolov, G. (eds) Numerical Methods and Applications. NMA 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4310. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70942-8_42
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70942-8_42
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-70940-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70942-8
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