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Least Privilege in Separation Kernels

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Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 9))

Abstract

We extend the separation kernel abstraction to represent the enforcement of the principle of least privilege. In addition to the inter-block flow control policy prescribed by the traditional separation kernel paradigm, we describe an orthogonal, finer-grained flow control policy by extending the protection of elements to subjects and resources, as well as blocks, within a partitioned system. We show how least privilege applied to the actions of subjects provides enhanced protection for secure systems.

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Joaquim Filipe Mohammad S. Obaidat

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Levin, T.E., Irvine, C.E., Nguyen, T.D. (2008). Least Privilege in Separation Kernels. In: Filipe, J., Obaidat, M.S. (eds) E-Business and Telecommunication Networks. ICETE 2006. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 9. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70760-8_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70760-8_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-70759-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70760-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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