Abstract
This chapter explores the methodological issues of modelling human behaviour at the relatively high abstraction level of the differences between individual-based and systems perspectives. Following earlier literature it will be argued that formal frameworks in the social sciences are essentially deductive, as they can be read as implications derived from a set of axioms, or postulates. However, in the social sciences implications derived from postulates do not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence with empirical observations. This marks an important difference with the natural sciences, highlighted by the possibility in the social sciences of choosing one of several formal frameworks. Therefore, a criterion is needed for judging the explanatory value of a model.
An attractive criterion, based on computer simulations using agent-based models, is the possibility of replicating a stylised version of an observed phenomenon. We argue that parallel to efforts taken in this direction, agent-based methods could also benefit from so-called serious games, where techniques from Artificial Intelligence in computer games are adapted for purposes other than entertainment.
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Grevers, W., van der Veen, A. (2008). Serious Games for Economists. In: Schredelseker, K., Hauser, F. (eds) Complexity and Artificial Markets. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 614. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70556-7_13
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