In Chapter 9 it is suggested that the descriptions of law encountered in part one is connected with the modernist approach by an ambition to describe law without sufficient arguments for the suggested description. Based on this connection the mistakes attributed to the theories in part one can be seen as a result of a misguiding modernist approach. It is suggested that conclusive support for the descriptive ambition cannot be derived from faith in the modernist approach in reasoning since that approach can be questioned. It is argued that we need other support for the ambition to describe. It is furthermore investigated what reasons can be given in support of the ambition to describe law.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Holmes, O. W. (1897). The path of the law. Harvard Law Review, 10.
Jehring, R. v. (1904). Der Zweck im Recht. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel.
Ross, A. (1953). Om ret og retfaerdighed. Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
(2009). Descriptive Theory of Law. In: The Quest for the Description of the Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70502-4_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70502-4_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-70501-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-70502-4
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)