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Highly Efficient Password-Based Three-Party Key Exchange in Random Oracle Model

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Book cover Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI 2008)

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Abstract

A password-based three-party encrypted key exchange (3PEKE) is a protocol enables any pair of two registered clients to establish session keys via the help of a trusted server such that each client shares only one password with the server. This approach greatly improves the scalability of key agreement protocol in distributed environments, and provides great user convenience. This paper proposes a new password-based 3PEKE scheme with only four message steps, which is the minimum among the published works. The proposed scheme is secure in the random oracle model.

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Chien, HY., Wu, TC. (2008). Highly Efficient Password-Based Three-Party Key Exchange in Random Oracle Model. In: Yang, C.C., et al. Intelligence and Security Informatics. ISI 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5075. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69304-8_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69304-8_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-69136-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69304-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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