Sosemanuk, a Fast Software-Oriented Stream Cipher

  • Côme Berbain
  • Olivier Billet
  • Anne Canteaut
  • Nicolas Courtois
  • Henri Gilbert
  • Louis Goubin
  • Aline Gouget
  • Louis Granboulan
  • Cédric Lauradoux
  • Marine Minier
  • Thomas Pornin
  • Hervé Sibert
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4986)


Sosemanuk is a new synchronous software-oriented stream cipher, corresponding to Profile 1 of the ECRYPT call for stream cipher primitives. Its key length is variable between 128 and 256 bits. It accommodates a 128-bit initial value. Any key length is claimed to achieve 128-bit security. The Sosemanuk cipher uses both some basic design principles from the stream cipher SNOW 2.0 and some transformations derived from the block cipher SERPENT. Sosemanuk aims at improving SNOW 2.0 both from the security and from the efficiency points of view. Most notably, it uses a faster IV-setup procedure. It also requires a reduced amount of static data, yielding better performance on several architectures.


Block Cipher Stream Cipher Algebraic Immunity Algebraic Attack Primitive Polynomial 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Côme Berbain
    • 1
  • Olivier Billet
    • 1
  • Anne Canteaut
    • 2
  • Nicolas Courtois
    • 3
  • Henri Gilbert
    • 1
  • Louis Goubin
    • 4
  • Aline Gouget
    • 5
  • Louis Granboulan
    • 6
  • Cédric Lauradoux
    • 2
  • Marine Minier
    • 7
  • Thomas Pornin
    • 8
  • Hervé Sibert
    • 9
  1. 1.Orange LabsFrance
  2. 2.INRIA-Rocquencourt, projet CODESFrance
  3. 3.University College of LondonUK
  4. 4.Université de VersaillesFrance
  5. 5.GemaltoFrance
  6. 6.EADSFrance
  7. 7.INSA de LyonFrance
  8. 8.Cryptolog InternationalFrance
  9. 9.NXP SemiconductorsFrance

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