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Bridging Games and Diplomacy

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Diplomacy Games

Abstract

The gap between models and reality is an issue covering almost every field of human knowledge, from physics to linguistics, and from economics to biology. On the one hand, quantitative people are mainly concerned with developing tools and consistent theories, even at the price of neglecting aspects of reality that do not fit in the frame or would lead to technical intricacies that might impede well-stated conclusions. On the other hand, observers and practitioners immersed in the “real world,” tend to ignore quantitative tools and theories for reasons ranging from lack of understanding to hostility.

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© 2007 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

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Rudnianski, M., Bestougeff, H. (2007). Bridging Games and Diplomacy. In: Avenhaus, R., Zartman, I.W. (eds) Diplomacy Games. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_8

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