Negotiation Models and Applications

Abstract

A variety of modeling approaches have been used as tools for analyzing aspects of negotiation and related interactions. Many models represent the mixed-motive feature of negotiation where parties are torn between cooperating to get an agreement and competing to get an acceptable agreement close to their own preferences. This feature is highlighted in the two-person games—particularly the Prisoner’s Dilemma—constructed and analyzed in the game theory tradition. The focus of these games is on solutions or outcomes, with attention paid to the distinction between equilibrium (minimizing losses) and optimal (maximizing joint gains) solutions. Similarly, outcomes or end states are the focus of models in the tradition of decision analysis: the bargaining frontier is a tool for identifying optimal or integrative solutions. Other models concentrate more on the negotiation process or throughputs including how impasses are resolved and how a process moves or transitions through stages. Some of these models provide a diagnostic function from which advice is generated; other process models identify the conditions that can either stall the talks (as when the parties are stuck in a stage or have disagreements within delegations) or provide momentum toward an agreement (as when they move quickly from one stage to another or reach consensus within delegations). Examples of each of these types of models are discussed in this chapter.