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Formal Models of Intervention: A Stocktaking and Analysis of the Implications for Policy

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Diplomacy Games

Abstract

International-relations theory can identify and frame important questions, but Pentagon and State Department officials will probably always be more interested in detailed case studies, prepared by area-studies experts. Theorizing about the causes of war might occasionally generate clean, law-like propositions that appeal to policymakers. But more typically, the discipline generates broad patterns that can be applied to particular cases only with a great deal of caution.

Portions of this chapter appear in an article entitled Formal Models and Intervention: Success as a Research Program and Policy Relevance, Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Winter/Spring 2007, Vol VIII, No. 1.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

    David Carment & Dane Rowlands

Authors
  1. David Carment
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  2. Dane Rowlands
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich, Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39, 85577, Neubiberg, Germany

    Rudolf Avenhaus

  2. School of Advanced International Studies, The John Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D.C., 20036, USA

    I. William Zartman

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© 2007 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

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Carment, D., Rowlands, D. (2007). Formal Models of Intervention: A Stocktaking and Analysis of the Implications for Policy. In: Avenhaus, R., Zartman, I.W. (eds) Diplomacy Games. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_3

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