Abstract
The focus of this chapter is on the usefulness of formal models to the practice of international negotiations—quite in the spirit of the mission of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)—and also to the theory of international negotiations itself, and less on lessons for the formal theory, even though many ideas about what should be done in the theory itself can be found in previous chapters.3 These conclusions deal with lessons for practitioners of international negotiations such as businesspeople, diplomats, and politicians, as well as providing lessons for modelers who want or have to develop formal models for the purpose of analyzing past negotiations in a descriptive way or, more challenging, for providing formal aid to actual negotiation.
Discussion of theoretical improvements is left to the many publications that describe trends and necessities of theoretical negotiation research (e.g., [16]).
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Zartman, I.W., Avenhaus, R. (2007). Conclusion: Lessons for Theory and Practice. In: Avenhaus, R., Zartman, I.W. (eds) Diplomacy Games. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_17
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