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Introduction: Formal Models of, in, and for International Negotiations

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Diplomacy Games

Abstract

Toward the end of the 1980s a major effort to promote the analysis of international negotiations was launched in the United States (USA) and subsequently at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), resulting, among other things, in the creation of the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) Program at IIASA in Laxenburg, near Vienna. In the first publications and books of that time (e.g., International Negotiation, edited by Kremenyuk [20] and Negotiation Analysis, edited by Young [51]) the question of the relevance of formal models and quantitative approaches in regard to negotiation was carefully analyzed by several authors representing the different scientific disciplines contributing to the area.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich, Neubiberg, Germany

    Rudolf Avenhaus

  2. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, USA

    I. William Zartman

Authors
  1. Rudolf Avenhaus
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  2. I. William Zartman
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich, Werner-Heisenberg-Weg 39, 85577, Neubiberg, Germany

    Rudolf Avenhaus

  2. School of Advanced International Studies, The John Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D.C., 20036, USA

    I. William Zartman

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© 2007 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

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Avenhaus, R., Zartman, I.W. (2007). Introduction: Formal Models of, in, and for International Negotiations. In: Avenhaus, R., Zartman, I.W. (eds) Diplomacy Games. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_1

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