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International Conference on Cryptology in Africa

AFRICACRYPT 2008: Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2008 pp 357–370Cite as

A Brief History of Provably-Secure Public-Key Encryption

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5023))

Abstract

Public-key encryption schemes are a useful and interesting field of cryptographic study. The ultimate goal for the cryptographer in the field of public-key encryption would be the production of a very efficient encryption scheme with a proof of security in a strong security model using a weak and reasonable computational assumption. This ultimate goal has yet to be reached. In this invited paper, we survey the major results that have been achieved in the quest to find such a scheme.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK

    Alexander W. Dent

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  1. Alexander W. Dent
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Serge Vaudenay

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Dent, A.W. (2008). A Brief History of Provably-Secure Public-Key Encryption. In: Vaudenay, S. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2008. AFRICACRYPT 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5023. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68164-9_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68164-9_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68159-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68164-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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