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References
Jackson, David, “The 1976 Convention and International Uniformity of Rules”, in: The new law: Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability (1986), pp. 126–143, at 126.
Beddard, Ralph, ‘The Implementation of the Convention’, in: ibid., pp. 152–160, at 152.
The 1924 Convention is reprinted in: Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library, The Ratification of Maritime Convention (2004), Vol.2, II. 2.300.
Selvig, Erling, “An Introduction to the 1976 Convention”, in: supra, note 5, pp. 3–17, at 3: “Historically, limits based on the value of the ship long prevailed...”
Wu, Chao, Pollution from the Carriage of Oil by Sea: Liability and Compensation (1996), p. 33: “This Convention has had little effect since its entry into force in 1931, mainly because it was not adopted by the major shipping nations and therefore had little practical value...” footnotes omitted. Also, Grime, R.P., ‘Implementation of the 1976 Limitation Convention: Liability for Maritime Claims’, Marine Policy, July 1988, pp. 306–313, at 309: “Judged from an international standpoint, the 1924 Convention was not a success.” Although the 1924 Convention was ratified or acceded to by 15 States, it did not achieve its objective, most notably because the United Kingdom did not accede to the Convention. See also Selvig, Erling, supra, note 8, at 5.
The 1957 Convention reprinted in: Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library: The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (2004), Vol.2, II.2.310.
Griggs, Patrick/ Williams, Richard, Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (1998), p. 3.
The 1976 LLMC, reprinted in: Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library: The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (2004), Vol. 2, II.2.330.
Mandaraka-Sheppard, Aleka, Modern Admiralty Law (2001), p. 880.
Ibid.
The LLMC 1996 Protocol, reprinted in: Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library: The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (2004), Vol. 2, II.2.340.
The Hague Rules were adopted at a diplomatic conference in Brussels in 1924 and were quickly adopted into the municipal legislation of many countries, reprinted in: Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library: The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (2004), Vol. 3, I.5.10.
The Hague-Visby Rules were produced in 1968. These Rules have been adopted relatively quickly into the municipal legislation of many countries, reprinted in: Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library: The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (2004), Vol. 2, II.5.20.
The Hamburg Rules as set out in the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 1978 came into force internationally on 1 November 1992, reprinted in: Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library: The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (2004), Vol. 2, II.5.220.
Griggs, Patrick/ Williams, Richard, supra, note 15, p. 113.
The convention is reprinted in: Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library: The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (2004), Vol. 3, II.5.170.
These conventions are reprinted in: Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library: The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (2004), Vol. 3, II.5.190, II.5.200 and II.202.
The convention is reprinted in: Lloyd’s Shipping Law Library: The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (2004), Vol. 3, II.7.125.
Griggs, Patrick/ Williams, Richard, supra, note 15, p. 113.
Wu, Chao, supra, note 10, p. 34, footnotes omitted.
Dykes, Andrew, ‘Limitation and Oil Pollution’, in: supra, note 5, pp. 144–151, at 144: “the emergency of supertankers in the late 1960’s, coupled with concern over the potential environmental consequences of casualties involving such ship, led to a widespread desire for an agreed international standard for liability together with ample compensation to be provided for the victims. It was felt that the existing provisions of the 1957 Limitation Convention did not provide an adequate level of compensation; if claims for oil pollution damage were pooled within that Convention’s limitation fund, the compensation available for pollution victims might be arbitrarily reduced, depending on the circumstances of the casualty and the size of other claims against the shipowner which would rank ratably against the limitation fund.”
Özçayir, Z.Oya: ‘Limitation of liability problems in cases of oil pollution’, available at: <http://www.turkishpilots.org/DOCUMENTS/Oya_Ozcayir_Liability. htm> (visited 8 June 2005).
Dykes, Andrew, supra, note 38, pp. 144–151, at 149. That even means that they may ratify the CLC and even extend relevant CLC provisions to bunker-oil spill, or it can have no limitation regime or its separate limitation regime.
Wu, Chao, ‘Liability and Compensation for Bunker Pollution’, 33 J. Mar. L. & Com. 553 (2002), pp. 553–567, at 562.
The list of the four types of pollution damage is from ITOPF: Oil Spill Compensation: a brief guide to the civil liability and fund conventions, pp. 2–3, available at: <http://www.itopf.com/compensation02.PDF> (visited 8 June 2005).
Grime, R.P., supra note 10, at 309.
Geoffrey Brice, Q.C., ‘The Scope of the Limitation Action’, in: supra, note 5, pp. 18–32, at 23.
Griggs, Patrick/ Williams, Richard, supra, note 15, p. 16.
Grime, R.P., supra, note 10, at 310.
Geoffrey Brice, Q.C., supra, note 55, at 24.
Chen, Xia, Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (2001), p. 38.
Griggs, Patrick/ Williams, Richard, supra, note 15, p. 18.
Chen, Xia, supra, note 61, p. 47–48.
Griggs, Patrick/ Williams, Richard, supra, note 15, p. 18.
Griggs, Patrick/ Williams, Richard, supra, note 15, p. 28.
Grime, Robert, ‘The Loss of the Right to Limit’, in: supra, note 5, pp. 102–112, at 100.
Patrick Griggs, supra, note 15, p. 46.
Beddard, Ralph, supra, note 6, at 152. Chen, Xia, supra, note 61, p. xiii: “A shipowner is not only exposed to the perils of the sea, but also vulnerable to the negligence of the master and crew members under the doctrine of respondeat superior, which holds the shipowner vicariously liable for the negligence of his employees.”
Gauci, Gotthard, ‘Limitation of Liability in Maritime Law: an Anachronism?’ 19 Marine Policy 65 (1995), pp. 65–74, at 66. See also Geoffrey Brice, Q.C., supra, note 55, at 18: “its origins are to be found in the desire of governments and the legislature to protect the financial interests of shipowners so as not to discourage the ownership and operation of ships.”
Seward, R. C., ‘The Insurance Viewpoint’, in: The new law: Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability (1986), supra, note 5, pp. 161–186, at 163.
Ibid.
See IMO LEG 76/WP.3.
Ibid.
Tsimplis, Michael N., ‘The Bunker Pollution Convention 2001: Completing and Harmonising the Liability Regime for Oil Pollution from Ships?’” 1 Lloyd’s Mar. & Com. L.Q. (2005), pp. 83–100, at 83.
Wu, Chao, supra, note 46, at 564: “If the Bunkers Convention has instead provided for a dedicated limitation fund, it would have created an additional burden to shipowners/insurers, because, for many cases, at least two limitation funds would have to be established in the event of a bunker spill (76 LLMC fund, BC fund). And if the spill comes from a vessel carrying HNS cargo, then three funds would have to be created (HNS fund, 76 fund, BC fund).”
See IMO LEG 74/4/4: “In addition, the Australian government made the observation in its submission to the last session of the Legal Committee (LEG 73/12) that the Convention would need to be closely coordinated with the CLC and HNS Conventions so that double limits would not apply to any one incident, e.g. when bunker oil is spilled from a ship carrying HNS at the same time as some of its cargo is released. A related point is that there may be incidents where the shipowner would be required to constitute three separate funds from the group up from CLC, HNS and bunkers-a potentially expensive exercise and an inefficient use of insurance capacity.”
See C.M.I. Documentation III, The German Maritime Law Association, pp. 32–41, at 36.
The British Law Association, see C.M.I. Documentation-III, pp. 50–59, at 56. In C.M.I. Documentation 1968-I & 1968-III, Many other countries considered limitation of liability together with insurance. For example, the Belgian Maritime Law Association, see C.M.I. Documentation-III, pp. 98–107, at 104: “what is more, if this limitation did not exist, it would very likely be impossible for the shipowner to find underwriters accepting to cover unlimited liability.” The Finnish Maritime Law Association, see C.M.I. Documentation-III, pp. 10–17, at 12: “Insurance is based on the principle that premiums paid or to be paid by the insured in the long run should cover his losses and in addition give the insurer a profit. In the cases now under discussion, the insurance would have to be for an unlimited amount or for an amount whose ceiling is very high. Most individual shipowners in the oil trade would find it difficult to make the necessary insurance arrangement.”
Athearn, James L., Risk and Insurance (1977), pp. 31–36.
See ibid., p. 32.
Grime, R.P., supra, note 10, p. 308, F.N.10.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See ibid., although “...the concept of ‘maximum insurable risk’ is very hard to define.”
Seward, R.C., ‘The Insurance Viewpoint’, in: supra, note 5, pp. 161–186, at 164: “...the reinsurance available today might not be there in the future in the event of significantly large claims coupled with the demise of the right to limit...” See also Chapter 4, Section F.I.
Bryant, Hugh, ‘Specialist Insurers Offer Real OPA Solution for Shipowners’, Lloyd’s List, Friday June 21 1996.
But see ibid., it says this belief was wrong.
For more detailed analysis see Alcantara, Leonard F./ Cox, Mary A., ‘OPA 90 Certificate of Financial Responsibility’, 23 J. Mar. L. & Com. 369 (1992), pp 369–386.
Wetterstein, Peter, ‘P&I and Environmental Damage’, in the seventh Axel Ax: son Johnson Colloquium on Maritime law Hässelby Colloquium, May, 27–28, 1993: P&I Insurance, pp. 115–139, at 134.
Steel, David, ‘Ships are Different: the Case for Limitation of Liability’, Lloyd’s Mar. & Com. L.Q. (1995), pp. 77–87, at 87.
Griggs, Patrick/ Williams, Richard, supra, note 15, p. 3.
Lloyd’s List: supra, note 113.
Gauci, Gotthard, supra, note 92, at 67. See also Wetterstein, Peter, supra, note 119, p. 135, “It is probable that were unlimited liability introduced, insurers would fix a ceiling on their liability (cf. the current discussion); this would be dependent on the insurance capacity-which would soon adapt to the new situation (there might of course be a temporary decrease in market capacity following a big disaster). The excess, more or less theoretical (cf. the experience so far), liability would then fall upon the shipping industry.”
Gauci, Gotthard, ibid., Footnote 30: it has been stated that since 1/1/1984, a nuclear operator is liable in terms of Swiss law without any benefit of limitation of nuclear damages which are occasioned by nuclear materials in his installation; obligatory insurance is limited to a specific amount. See also Faure Michael (ed.), Deterrence, Insurability, and Compensation in Environmental Liability: Future Developments in the European Union (2003), p. 201: “...Recent examples have also shown that with respect to the nuclear liability conventions some countries have introduced a duty to insure up to a limited amount, but have left the liability of the licensee of the nuclear power plant itself unlimited.”
Brown, Robert H., Introduction to Marine Insurance: Training Notes for Brokers (1995), in section 14, p. 5.
Gauci, Gotthard, supra, note 92, p. 66.
Chen, Xia, supra, note 61, p.xvii.
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(2007). Limitation of Liability and the Limit of Insurance. In: Compulsory Insurance and Compensation for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage. Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, vol 5. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45903-3_6
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