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Efficient Universal Padding Techniques for Multiplicative Trapdoor One-Way Permutation

  • Yuichi Komano
  • Kazuo Ohta
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2729)

Abstract

Coron et al. proposed the ES-based scheme PSS-ES which realizes an encryption scheme and a signature scheme with a unique padding technique and key pair. The security of PSS-ES as an encryption scheme is based on the partial-domain one-wayness of the encryption permutation. In this paper, we propose new ES schemes OAEP-ES, OAEP++-ES, and REACT-ES, and prove their security under the assumption of only the one-wayness of encryption permutation. OAEP-ES, OAEP++-ES, and REACT-ES suit practical implementation because they use the same padding technique for encryption and for signature, and their security proof guarantees that we can prepare one key pair to realize encryption and signature in the same way as PSS-ES. Since one-wayness is a weaker assumption than partial-domain one-wayness, the proposed schemes offer tighter security than PSS-ES. Hence, we conclude that OAEP-ES, OAEP++-ES, and REACT-ES are more effective than PSS-ES. REACT-ES is the most practical approach in terms of the tightness of security and communication efficiency.

Keywords

Encryption Scheme Signature Scheme Random Oracle Security Proof Signing Query 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yuichi Komano
    • 1
  • Kazuo Ohta
    • 2
  1. 1.ToshibaKawasaki-shi, KanagawaJapan
  2. 2.The University of Electro-CommunicationsTokyoJapan

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