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A Formal Framework for Handling Conflicting Desires

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Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU 2003)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 2711))

Abstract

This paper combines ideas from argumentation [1,8] with desires and planning rules, in order to give a formal account of how consistent sets of intentions can be obtained from a conflicting set of desires. We show how conflicts may arise between desires and we resolve them. We argue that the set of desires can be clustered in three categories: i) the intentions of the agent, ii) the rejected desires and iii) the desires in abeyance. Finally, we show that the use of argumentation with desires is different from the usual kind of argumentation with default rules.

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Amgoud, L. (2003). A Formal Framework for Handling Conflicting Desires. In: Nielsen, T.D., Zhang, N.L. (eds) Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty. ECSQARU 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2711. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45062-7_45

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45062-7_45

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-40494-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45062-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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